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ABSTRACT
The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) is an attempt to incorporate
private sector business incentives into the public sector. Truly efficient incentive
initiatives must provide the motivation and necessary resources for organizations to
make cost reducing investments. If either the motivation or resources are missing an
organization will not become more cost effective and efficient. The private sector goal
is profit maximization. This goal is projected to the firm's production and service
divisions through chargeback methods. DBOF is a variant of cost based chargeback.
This thesis examines the application of this incentive with special emphasis on Navy
contracting activities. It found that some motivation for making investments in
efficiency and effectiveness is provided through gainsharing and competition.
However, only nominal resources are provided for investment. DBOF could be
enhanced by allowing for profit retention and mitigating price sensitivity. This
requires the ability to carry unexpended funding forward to the next fiscal year and
implementing success sharing or a similar initiative. Success sharing, an innovative
suggestion by Dr. Francois Melese, allows the activity to share in some of the cost
savings by reducing price (unit cost) slightly less than the cost savings. The Government
captures most of the profits, but it provides the activity with some profit to reinvest in
more cost reducing investments. Aoeassion For
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The demise of the Russian military threat has lead to a
reevaluation of the need for the tremendous military power
America is presently supporting. Public pressure to reduce
spending and cut away at the Federal deficit has increased
Congress's desire to cut the huge military budget and reduce
the burden on taxpayers. Several initiatives have been
undertaken to redefine the role of the American military and
develop a cost effective, leaner military.
The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) and its
subset, Unit Cost Resourcing, is one such initiative. DBOF is
an attempt to bring private sector cost effectiveness to
Department of Defense (DoD) support activities. Unit Cost
Resourcing challenges service activity managers by increasing
the visibility of costs involved in providing a service and
establishing unit cost performance goals for the organization
to work towards. Conceptually, this provides users of service
activities with the total cost picture of a service/supply,
allowing the user to make more informed decisions and reduce
costs. Additionally, a service organization's ability to meet
unit cost goals may become a consideration in evaluating their
efficiency and productivity.
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DBOF works on a rolling break even concept, where profits
are returned to the customer ana losses made up in the
following year prices. Customers are charged a stabilized
rate for a service which approximates the unit cost adjusted
for the previous year profits or losses. (These concepts are
discussed in detail in Chapter II.)
The civil sector is rewarded and motivated by increased
profits when costs are reduced to optimal levels and penalized
by losses when costs are not recouped. These
profits/incentives serve many purposes including discretionary
funds for improvements in facilities, technology, training and
production equipment which further reduces costs and increases
efficiency.
DoD activities are not provided profits per se. In the
early stages of implementing unit costing, "fat" will be
easily identified and cut away. In the short run, this will
generate profits DoD managers can utilize. However, as costs
approach the "ultimate or best" cost, managers will be
required to make significant investments in facilities,
people, training and technology to make long term cost
reductions.
The unit cost can and should provide funds to finance
capital improvements costing less than $25,000.00, or
operating expenses such as training. Yet, any expenses made
to enhance long term performance, which were not in the
budget, will increase unit costs and may cause an adverse
2
evaluation for even the most prudent managers and their
subordinates. Advance planning will become crucial. However
if correctly done, planning should allow for the proper
budgeting to cover most efficiency investments.
Profit is a major consideration in any private sector
operation, yet DBOF makes no real time allowances for
profit/incentive or the important functions it serves.
Specifically, DBOF does not allow managers to immediately
reinvest profits to improve facilities, technology or people
through training. While the DBOF concept displays many
desirable features, the incentives of the program may send the
wrong signal to all levels of the organization.
Unit costing doesn't provide adequate incentives for
managers to undertake cost reducing capital investments.
Managers invest in capital equipment to increase their
profits .... Again, further analysis is needed to determine
if unit costing improves investment incentives relative to
current practices. (Gates93, p. 24)
B. OBJECTIVE
The Defense Business Ope:ations Fund's (DBOF) mechanisms
for motivating managers to take risks to reduce costs may not
adequately support this important aspect of DBOF philosophy.
The purpose of this thesis is to research the application of
incentives and, if appropriate, investigate incentive programs
which could be used in DBOF applications.
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question of this thesis is: Under the
Defense Budget Operations Fund (DBOF) concept and unit costing
for contracting services, will the managers of contracting
activities be motivated and have the needed resources to
accept increased short term costs to improve either the
effectiveness or efficiency of the contracting services they
provide in the long term? This question will be answered by
addressing the following subsidiary research questions:
1. What are the essential factors of Defense Business
Operations Fund?
2. What is the process for establishing a costing structure
under Unit Cost Resourcing?
3. What incentives and capabilities are structured into a
DBOF/Unit Cost Resourcing contracting environment?
4. What are the benefits and disadvantages of chargeback
methods and how well do they produce incentives and
resources?
5. How could the incentive structure be improved and
incorporated into DBOF and the Unit Cost Resourcing
concept?
D. SCOPE
While DBOF may become applicable to all DoD service
activities, this thesis will specifically look at contracting
service activities such as Navy Regional Contracting Centers
(NRCC) and Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) and
serve as a policy analysis. The Navy expects to implement
DBOF for contracting services in Fiscal Year 1995.
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2. METHODOLOGY
Research was conducted in several manners. Extreme long
distances made direct observation impossible in most
instances. Therefore, the main thrust of research was
telephone interviews. Interviews were supported by
questionnaires which were developed and forwarded to the
commanding officers of NRCCs and FISCs. The questionnaires
assessed the desirability of profit/losses, potential
investments to improve efficiency and reduce costs and
feelings toward an appropriate method of calculating and
capturing profit.
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE




2. The Defense Business Operations Fund and Unit Cost
Resourcing
3. Efficiency and DBOF
4. Data Presentation and Data Analysis
5. Incentive Analysis
6. Conclusions and Recommendations.
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II. THE DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses Defense Management Review Decision
Number 971 which created the Defense Business Operations Fund
(DBOF) and provides the framework under which "Unit Costing"
functions. First the history and purpose of DBOF is reviewed.
This will provide the foundation for the next two sections
which discuss the most essential factors of DBOF, Unit Costing
and stabilized rates. Finally, a summary of the highlights of
DBOF, the Naval Supply Systems Command's tentative proposal to
incorporate contracting services into DBOF and the weaknesses
of the DBOF-Unit costing concept will close out this chapter.
B. DMRD 971 AND THE DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND (DBOF)
The National Security Act of 1947 which was amended in
1949 allowed for revolving funds in the Department of Defense
(DoD).1 In Fiscal Year (FY) 1991, the two major DoD revolving
funds were Industrial Funds and Stock Funds. Industrial Funds
supported activities such as shipyards, printing plants,
repair and overhaul facilities, airlift and sealift
IA revolving fund is a non-expiring, self renewing
appropriation that provides a financial corpus to finance support
activities' operations. Consumer purchases from a revolving fund
activity reimburse the fund making more capital available for new
output. (Seiden9l, p. 33)
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transportation and real property maintenance services. Stock
Funds supported the availability of such things as electronic
supplies, construction supplies and aircraft and ship parts.
As a result of a declining defense budget and need for
greater efficiency, Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD)
Number 971 initiated the Defense Business Operations Fund
(DBOF). DBOF is a large revolving fund, under the control of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which incorporated the
Industrial Funds, Stock Funds and other revolving funds of all
military services. According to DMRD Number 971, the basic
issue of this incorporation is: "can the DoD financial
management system provide better information for decision
makers and better tools for managers?" (DMRD 971, p. 1)
This DMRD has significantly changed business and
accounting procedures for supporting activities. The Navy






"* Research and Development Activities
"* Printing and Publication Services
"* Information Services
"* Defense Commissary Agency
"* Defense Clothing
7
"* Defense Finance and Accounting Services
"• Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service. 2
New activities, including contracting services, have been
excluded from the Fund. The plan is to incorporate those
activities at a later time. Government support for DBOF has
been questionable. Speculation is that this delay may be a
result of the Clinton administration and/or Congress's
questionable desire to continue.
There are several valid reasons for implementing DBOF
including: collecting cost data, gathering output information
and implementing Unit Cost Resourcing (UCR). The Defense
Business Operations Fund Implementation Plan states:
The primary goal of implementing the Fund is to provide a
business management structure that encourages managers and
employees of DoD support organizations to provide quality
products or services at the lowest cost. A major feature
of this business management structure is increased
emphasis on business operations. This business operations
structure identifies each business area, the products or
services, and the total cost of operations within that
business area.
Under this structure, customers establish reauirements and
are charged, through the rate structure,' for the cost of
2This list is not all inclusive. A team was assigned early in
the implementation of DBOF to investigate and recommend other
services which could be absorbed into DBOF. DMRD 971 states the
long range goal is to move all support establishments into DBOF.
However, they must meet three requirements: "1)have identified
outputs of the business; 2)have a cost accounting system that
relates to those outputs; and 3)can identify the customers of the
business." (DMRD 971, p. 2)
3The products or services, and the total cost of operations
form the foundation for "unit costing." The rate structure is a
value established by the OSD called the "stabilized rate." Both
are very important and will be discussed in great detail in the
8
industrial and commercial-type services and products
provided. Providers, in turn, produce quality goods and
services which satisfy customer requirements at the lowest
cost....
By making the producing organization responsible for
managing all costs associated with delivering the goods or
services, those managers will identify cost drivers and
can focus their management improvement efforts
accordingly. Better cost visibility enables managers at
all levels to make informed decisions ....
The Fund expands the availability of business management
information and provides a structure that supports the
customer-provider relationship. The focus is on quality
customer service at reduced costs. (DBOF93, p. 2)
DBOF may establish a competitive environment to reduce
costs between organizations providing the same or similar
services. Customers would then have the incentive to "shop"
for the best value and perhaps award long term service
arrangements (Inter and Intra-service Support Agreements)
between DoD customers and providers. Much like the private
market environment, customers could negotiate favorable rates
or better service arrangements and the provider would receive
a guaranteed customer base to enhance his rate structure or
absorb fixed overhead expenses.
Some services provided under DBOF are sole source, such as
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), and have no
competition. In these instances, the Defense Management
Review Decision 971 states; "The lack of competition will be
overcome by an environment that puts a premium on quality and
encourages managers to reduce their costs." (Atwood92, p. 7)
next chapter.
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C. UNIT COST RESOURCING
"Unit costing" requires users to reimburse providers for
certain services and support activities. Unit costing, an
initiative of Donald Shycoff, the then Principal Deputy DoD
Comptroller, is an attempt to improve efficiency of Government
operations during times of significant downsizing and budget
cut backs. In the civilian arena, this is the normal way of
doing business. However, this practice has only been used in
limited military applications prior to 1991. Some
applications include Naval shipyards and public works
activities. Traditionally, activities performed a function or
mission and received an annual budget to carry out this
mission. The terms "mission funded" or "mission budgeted" are
commonly used to describe this budget technique. This was
considered very ineffective and encouraged managers to
conserve funding until the end of the fiscal year and then
"use it or lose it." One study by Sherwood (1977) indicated
a one hundred and twenty percent increase in spending the last
month of the fiscal year. (Seiden9l, p. 18)
Under DBOF, support activities, sometimes called
providers, will not receive annual "mission funding."
Instead, this funding will be allocated to operating
activities (frequently called customers). Customers will then
seek the services they require and pay a fee for the service
(the stabilized rate). This change may allow customers to
shop for services from public or private sources and in
10
certain areas, such as Public Works and shipyards, even use
competitive procedures to ensure they receive the best service
and product value at the most reasonable rate.
This "competition" between public and private activities
has two apparent advantages; 1)providers must actively search
for ways to keep costs down and 2)customers may save funding
by procuring services from the least expensive provider.
Funds saved through the efficient and resourceful utilization
of fees paid would be available for operational fleet
activities. Therefore, the provider should not try to make a
profit but to reduce cost and budget to the "break-even point"
while providing quality "Service to the Fleet."
1. Budgeting Under Unit Costing
Unit costing is simply the activity's total cost
divided by the activity's total output. Total cost is all
direct, indirect and general and administrative costs incurred
by the organization.4 Total output is all the identified
outputs, including "primary" or "other" outputs. Once the
unit costs are established, they are forwarded to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for approval.
The Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) establishes
unit cost goals for the activities in DBOF. These goals are
the unit cost adjusted "for inflation, new elements of cost
'Total cost includes the cost of depreciation and military
personnel filling billets at the activity. These costs under
mission funding where not charged to the activity.
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not previously considered and expected productivity
improvements." (Hough93, p. 15) Once incorporated into DBOF,
at the beginning of each fiscal year, OSD provides each
activity an obligational target which is the predetermined
unit cost goal times expected production (output or demand)
for the year. Should output fall below the expected
production level, then the provider's authority to incur costs
similarly decreases. At the conclusion of the fiscal year,
the actual production times unit cost goal is computed to
determine the providers "earned cost authority." (DBOF93, p.
14) The amount the activity obligated minus their earned cost
authority equals the activities' total profits or losses.
It is important to note that the obligational target
covers all expenses except "capital budget" expenses. Capital
budget expenses are any equipment, software, minor
construction, and other management improvements costing
$25,000.00 or more. These costs must be amortized and
depreciated over a predetermined period. The $25,000.00 limit
is based on congressional actions on expense/investment
criteria. 5  (DBOF93, p. 19)
The anticipated benefits of unit cost are summarized
as:
Improved operations are expected to come about as a result
of producers more carefully managing their operations to
minimize costs. Consumers, who will pay higher prices for
5This limit was raised from $15,000.00 to $25,000.00 in the
Fiscal Year 1994 Authorization Act.
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fully costed goods will economize, buying only essentials
or seeking alternate sources offering services at lower
price.
Personnel 2erformance evaluations will be more meaningful
because of standardized cost methods and comparability
among similar organizations of the different services.
Budget evaluation, support and planning will become
simpler and more consistent. Similar performance measures
will apply to diverse organizations.
Decision makers in consuming and producing activities will
know the full cost of resources they consume and can make
intelligent decisions that integrate cost as an important
consideration. OSD managers can more easily assess
impacts of important decisions and unit cost information
will provide additional data on which to base decisions
such as base closures and realignment. (Seiden9l, p. 30)
D. STABILIZED RATE
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) performs the
vital functions of controlling the Defense Business Operations
Fund, approving unit cost rates and establishing the
"stabilized rate." The stabilized rate is the rate which
customers must pay for services acquired from Defense Business
Operations Fund activities. This brings the full cost of
providing a service in view of the customer and provides an
incentive to procure services only when needed and at the best
rate possible.
The stabilized rate is a compilation of a charge for
services plus or minus a surcharge to bring the DBOF back to
a break-even status. For example, if the Fund has collected
profits and is over its desired level, OSD will reduce the
stabilized rate so that customers enjoy the return of the
13
profits. Similarly, if the Fund is under the desired level
then the stabilized rate is increased to make up the losses
through increased customers payments.
Stabilized rates are set for the year so that customers
can anticipate and budget the funds required to procure the
services they need.
E. SUMMOARY OF DBOF, UNIT COSTING AND STABILIZED RATE
By now it should be apparent that the DBOF is a large pool
of funds used to finance all the service activities
incorporated in DBOF. Providers withdraw funding based on the
number of units of production they have completed times the
approved unit costs. Customers reimburse the Fund by paying
the stabilized rate for the service provided by the providers.
This research indicates DBOF presents a financial cycle such
as depicted in Figure 1-1.
The Defense Business Operations Fund Cycle
to CustomW CU _
Unit Cost to ftmlenProvider Customer
Figure 1-1
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Unit cost provides a tremendous incentive for providers to
reduce costs. High unit cost activities have traditionally
been the first activities examined when closures and
realignments are being considered, while low unit cost
activities are seen as efficient and effective. This seems
common-sense, but a complete study of costs and output is
required to accurately determine which activity is providing
their service in the most effective and efficient manner.
Hunter and Hicks in Unit Costing at the Naval Postgraduate
School, June 1991 provide a thorough economic analysis of
consolidation based on unit cost and is recommended for
further reading.
Additionally, unit cost can easily be used for personnel
performance evaluations. This provides a very personal
impetus for commanding officers and subordinates to be
competitive and meet unit costs goals. Success could mean
promotions and job security.
The stabilized rate is important to the DBOF customers.
This is the fee customers pay to reimburse DBOF for the
services they require. This fee is also used in the budgeting
process to compute the amount of mission funding customers
will receive at the beginning of each fiscal year. For
example, if CINCPACFLT expects to overhaul seven ships during
a fiscal year, they will receive funding at a stabilized rate
for seven overhauls as part of their annual budget.
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F. INCORPORATION OF NAVAL CONTRACTING SERVICES
Navy Regional Contracting Centers and Fleet and Industrial
Supply Center contracting services are tentatively scheduled
to be implemented into DBOF in FY 1995. These activities
provide a myriad of contracting services including:
* Large contracts, competitively negotiated, sealed bid and
other than full and open competition.
* Delivery orders.
9 Small purchases. 6
* Contract modifications and changes.
The primary outputs are considered small purchases and
large contracts. An approximation of the unit cost for these
outputs can be calculated from the Level of Difficulty Report
provided as Appendix A. A flat fee structure was selected for
small purchases. During FY 92 Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) completed 1,192,836 small purchase actions at a total
cost $23,029,000 for a unit cost of $19.31.
The tremendous variations in large contracts makes
establishing one pricing mechanism impossible. For example,
a $26,000.00 sealed bid contract is much easier and less time
consuming to award than a $26,000.00 competitive, negotiated
contract. These differing levels of difficulty made output
6Small purchases are contracts under $25,000.00. Pier side
Procurement does a tremendous amount of small purchases for ships
and operating forces whose Unit Identification Code (UIC) starts
with "R" for Pacific Fleet and "V"1 for Atlantic Fleet, e.g., V21233
is the USS CARR (FFG-52). Pier side Procurement will not be
incorporated into DBOF at this time.
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identification very difficult. Awarding one large contract
could cost substantially more than another. A Process Action
Team (PAT) headed by NAVSUP, Code 02, reviewed the contracting
process for the appropriate output mechanism and pricing
structure. As a result of this study, the PAT recommended
using the Productive Unit Resource (PUR) as a large
contracting output.7 The PUR is a value developed annually
through a sophisticated unit costing system designed by NAVSUP
to assist in budgeting the various NAVSUP activities. For
example, the Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers produced
30,255 Productive Unit Resources in FY 92 large contracts at
a cost of $11,292,000. In unit costing, this equates one PUR
to $373.23. An example of the tentative pricing schedule for
Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers is shown as Table 1-1.
Contract Amount Number of PUR times Unit Cost
(in Thousands) PUR rate
$25 - $100 4 (times $373.23) $1,492.92
$100 - $1,000 12 (times $373.23) $4,478.76
Greater than $1,000 15 (times $373.23) $5,598.45
All "start up" programs have weaknesses. This brief
analysis of Naval contracting services' approach to Unit Cost
Resourcing highlights three significant weaknesses, most of
?An in depth knowledge of the PUR system is not required for
the purposes of this thesis.
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which can be directly attributable to an inadequate accounting
system.a
First, unit total costs are too highly aggregated to serve
as anything more than a cursory productivity index....
A second, more subtle problem is that DBOF business areas
spread total costs over all good and services which assumes
that fixed and variable costs are driven by the same causal
factors ....
The third, and most obvious, problem with average unit
costing is the real potential for a funding shortfall.
Because some costs are truly fixed, there is no question
that earned authority under UCR [Unit Cost Resourcing] will
be insufficient. Since output will most likely decline for
the foreseeable future average unit costing threatens to cut
into the fixed cost of continuing operations. (Hough93, p.
17)
Hough breaks fixed costs down into two distinct
categories. First, "capacity costs" which are defined as the
absolute minimal level of expenses necessary to maintain the
installation's normal operating capacity plus minimum expenses
necessary to preserve essential wartime surge capacity. These
costs cannot be altered in the short run. Second, there is
"discretionary fixed costs" which are the expenditures above
the minimal level that enhance operations without directly
increasing capacity. These costs are part of the current year
budget process and therefore somewhat controllable.
8The DBOF Implementation Plan addresses this problem and
requires an interim standardized accounting system (Automated
Payroll Cost and Personnel System), now called the Defense Business





The management problem becomes one of compensating for the
losses induced by not explicitly recognizing fixed costs.
These losses will come first from any budget "slack" built
into funding baselines over the years. After slack is
absorbed, the function must cover fixed costs from any
direct operating and maintenance funds received or else
lower fixed costs. Of course, part of the incentive on
UCR is to reduce discretionary fixed expenses where
possible. (Hough93, p. 17)
There is significant pressure on managers and organizations to
meet unit cost goals. To achieve .,it cost goals, managers
may forego discretionary expenditures to upgrade facilities,
improve quality or augment training. Hence, potential long
term gains may be lost for the benefit of short term savings.
This appears to contradict the desired purpose of DBOF and
Unit Cost Resourcing.
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III. EFFICIENCY AND DBOF
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the major objectives of the Defense Business
Operations Fund (DBOF) is to introduce the efficiencies of the
private market sector into DoD support operations. This is
done through Unit Cost Resourcing (UCR).
This chapter will look at the need for commanding officers
to risk short term investments for potential long term cost
reductions and briefly summarize the economist view of private
market efficiency, both technical and economic. For more
information on efficiency and DBOF see; Gates and Terasawa,
Imolementing Unit Costing: Efficiency in Translating Policy to
Practice, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
B. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
An activity is technically efficient when it is
"minimizing production costs at any output level." (Gates93,
p. 7) This is synonymous with operating at any point along
the activities' Average Total Cost (ATC) curve. Figure 3-1
depicts two hypothetical ATC curves. For discussion purposes,
let us say the upper ATC curve is for a Navy Regional
Contracting Center (NRCC) which does not use automated
procedures to generate contracts. The lower ATC curve
represents a Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) which
20
utilizes a computer to generate the contract and develop the
required historical files and records. This procedure
substantially lowers its average total cost. While both
activities are producing in a technically efficient way, the









In order for the NRCC to move down to the lower ATC curve
and compete with the FISC, the NRCC must use some
9While both are technically efficient, neither is producing
the right quantity to achieve the lowest possible unit cost.
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discretionary funding or acquire capital investment funding to
procure a computer and the required training.
C. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Economic efficiency requires:
1. Expanding output as long as the incremental benefit of
one more unit of output (i.e., marginal benefit or MB)
exceeds the incremental cost of producing that unit
(i.e., marginal cost or MC). (Gates93, p. 6)
2. Costs must be measured in terms of opportunity costs and
production must be technically efficient. (Gates93, p.
6)
Truly efficient organizations operate economically efficient.
That is, they are producing the right amount with no excess or
idle capacity (MC=MB) and their production costs are minimized
for that level output.
DoD has stated providers must meet all demand at the
regulated price. The regulated price is computed to generate
zero profits. DoD's intervention and regulation significantly
hinders suppliers from achieving requirement one above,
producing the right amount. Therefore, more than likely
economic efficiency can not be achieved.
D. EFFICIENCY AND DBOF
Under DBOF, economic efficiency can not be achieved.
Instead, providers are encouraged to operate where demand
crosses ATC. This is the point where the producer breaks
even. Producers are also rewarded for having low unit costs.
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Thus, they are encouraged to produce close to the minimum
point on their ATC curve, see Figure 3-2. This leaves three
possible outcomes 1)demand intersects the ATC curve in the
optimal range (Figure 3-2), 2)demand intersects ATC to the
left of the optimal range, or 3)demand intersects ATC to the
right of the optimal range.
Optimal Range
$/Qty






To improve command performance and comparisons with other
similar activities, an activity producing within the optimal
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range should concentrate on maintaining demand and reducing
unit cost to attract additional demand. This is reflected by
a shift in the ATC curve down and to the right, see Figure 3-
3. Movement of the ATC curve would require either a short
term investment to enhance quality, a process improvement
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An activity producing where demand intersects to the left
of the optimal range must increase demand or reduce costs to
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be competitive, see Figure 3-4. This situation is indicative
of a provider who has excess capacity. As Chapter IV will
indicate, demand is generally based on proximity of customer
to provider. Since prices are fixed at the stabilized rate,
producers have little influence on demand. Providers with
excess capacity should concentrate on improving quality to
increase demand. However, other actions can be taken. For
instance, saving can generally be achieved by reducing work
force or facilities. These actions do not require additional
short term funding. Under DBOF, competition between suppliers
will motivate providers to take these actions.
Right of Optimal
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Activities producing to the right of the optimal range on
the ATC curve are in the worst possible position. This is
indicative of a provider who has a backlog of demand and can
not keep up with requirements. In order to compete, this
provider must reduce demand and give up business or increase
efficiency to lower the unit cost, see Figure 3-5.10













'°A basic tenant of DBOF is providers will meet all demand at
the established price. Reducing demand may be difficult.
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U. CONCLUSIONS
One goal of DBOF is to provide quality services at the
lowest possible cost or at the lowest point on the ATC curve.
The objective of this research is to determine if DBOF
provides the incentive and resources to accommodate moving to
this area of technical efficiency. In situations where a
provider has excess demand or desires to reduce cost and
increase efficiency, additional short term funding may be
required. As will be discussed in Chapters IV and V,
competition between contracting activities should provide the
necessary incentive for activities with excess capacity to
reduce costs. Unfortunately, demand is continuously
fluctuating. Contracting activities must constantly monitor
demand and ATC for optimal performance. This will frequently
generate requirements for short term investments under the
$25,000.00 investment criteria.
Unit Cost Resourcing divides total cost by anticipated
workload, then sets a lower unit cost target to motivate
providers to reduce costs. In time, the unit cost target must
fall on or below the ATC curve. When the unit cost target
falls below the ATC curve for a provider, the commanding
officer will have no discretionary funding to enhance
efficiency or maintain facilities. Commanding officers of
higher unit cost providers then may decide to forego the risk
of short term investments under $25,000.00, which could
27
possibly reduce long term costs, to avoid suffering adverse
personal evaluations.
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Government has long recognized the value of profit in
the private business sector. Under competitive conditions,
market forces determine the appropriate level of profit and
the Government accepts this as "reasonable." However, when
market competition does not exist, the Government calculates
a reasonable level of profit and negotiates contracts,
utilizing the Weighted Guidelines Method. These profits
reward risk takers for accepting tasks requiring higher levels
of skill and encourage cost responsibility and cost effective
capital investment. (ASPM86, p. 4-2)
The Defense Business Operations Fund works on a rolling
break-even process which does not allow contracting activities
to carry profits generated in one fiscal year to the next.
11
If a contracting activity makes a profit one year, OSD will
reduce the target unit cost the next year, making these goals
more difficult to achieve. When the cost of awarding a
contract is reduced to the optimal or "best cost," where will
contracting activities find the incentive and funding to take
11While DBOF does not allow savings to be carried forward to
the next fiscal year, many advantages still accrue. Managers are
no longer tied down to line item accounting and can utilize the
funding in a way that is most beneficial to the organization.
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the risks and make the investment for long term cost
reductions?
The objective of this research was to determine if
commanding officers of contracting activities felt DBOF would
provide a business environment with the incentives and
resources to truly reduce contracting costs. Alternatively,
does DBOF just provide lower unit cost goals without the
accompanying resources Lo obtain those goals. Commanding
officers of all four Navy Regional Contracting Centers (NRCC)
and ten Fleet and Industrial Support Centers (FISC) were
surveyed in the following areas:
1. Adequacy of the present cost accounting system to
provide valuable decision making information to
contracting managers.
2. Competition anticipated between contracting activities
based on relative unit cost.
3. Adequacy of funding under DBOF and plans to enhance
budgeting.
4. Knowledge of incentives as they apply to DBOF and
possible improvements.
Of the fourteen activities surveyed, only the three overseas
activities did not respond to the survey. (The survey
questions and data are presented by the area they queried, not
in numerical sequence.)
1. Accounting Systems
Questions about accounting systems were designed to
determine if accounting systems provide adequate management
information to isolate the cost of contracting services.
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Question 1. DBOF replaces mission funding with unit
costing. How confident are you that your activity's cost
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Activities commented that the accounting system does not:
"* Breakdown cost beyond labor and other expenses.
"* Consistently allocate indirect costs at activities where
the burden is shared across functional branches. For
example, FISCs do not allocate any overhead between the
different departments such as customer service,
transportation and regional contracting.
The majority of commanding officers felt that the
accounting system could not generate reliable decision making
information for unit costing purposes. Resources will be
required to upgrade these systems to provide the kind of
information needed to effectively analyze cost drivers and
determine where savings can be achieved. Until such
accounting systems are in place, there is no accurate way to
determine if each activity is reporting and accumulating
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information in a consistent manner. Activities having more
than one cost center, i.e., the FISCs, could enhance their
unit cost by burdening more efficient and/or less competitive
cost centers with a greater share of the overhead. According
to one budget analyst, "It's like comparing apples to
oranges." (Moore93)
2. Competition
Three questions were asked to assess the expected
level of competition between activities. There was one
straight forward question and two implicit indicators. The
implicit indicators involve l)awareness of other activities'
unit costs and 2)perceived accuracy of unit cost in measuring
effectiveness and efficiency.
Question 2. Unit costing could easily be utilized to
evaluate how efficient (competitive) an organization or
commanding officer is at producing a service. With
downsizing playing such a vital role in defense cuts, high
unit cost organizations would likely be the first screened
for realignment and closure. Do you feel the unit cost is
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The majority of activities felt unit cost was a poor indicator
of effectiveness because:
"* Methods for allocating significant fixed costs and
overhead could preclude fairly evaluating activities using
unit cost.
"* Differing organizational structures (e.g., Naval Regional
Contract Center versus a Fleet and Industrial Supply
Center) and differing accounting methods distort unit
costs making comparison ineffective.
Question 3. Do you have a relative idea of the unit cost










"* Unit cost less overhead is readily available from NAVSUP
02E (through NAVSUP's Productive Unit Resource system).
"• Reported (NAVSUP 02E) unit costs are inaccurate.
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Question 4. Do you feel competition between contracting
activities for customers will develop?
Question #4
Compettlw Envlkonment
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Comments included:
"* Competition is happening now with customers who have not
identified any particular contracting activity.
"* The most important element is proximity between customer
and provider, not unit cost. Better the devil you know.
"* Competition should only be allowed on a yearly basis.
The responses to these questions indicates three
perceptions: l)unit cost is not considered an effective
efficiency measure; 2)activities are presently sensitive to
unit cost, both their own and other providers; and
3)competition is happening now and is expected to continue
into the future. NAVSUP's budgeting system generates and
disseminates unit cost information on contracting activities.
Activities expressed concern with inconsistencies
between accounting systems when evaluating an activity based
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on unit cost rather than their ability to produce at a level
where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. Those activities
which produce closest to where marginal cost equals marginal
benefit are the most efficient.
3. Adequacy of Funding
Commanding officers were asked three questions to
assess the adequacy of anticipated funding under DBOF.
Question 5. With the loss of mission funding, do you feel
you will have access to adequate, reliable funding to
carry out quality personnel training, equipment
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Comments included:
"* If unit costing is implemented correctly an organization
could have more than enough funding or at least more than
provided under mission funding.
"* If not regulated by headquarters, activities will control
their own destiny in the marketplace. However, this is
unlikely.
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* Funding will be tied to ability to maintain or expand
customer base.
Question 7. Will you include elements of future costs in
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Comments included:
"* This may result in pricing yourself out of the market.
Better to rely on profits generated each year.
"* Once the customer base has been established, reinvestment
costs will have to be factored in to increase
productivity.
"* Costs should be part of annual budget planning.
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Question 10. Under unit costing, non-recurring expenses
must be planned well in advance to ensure sufficient
funding is available. Do you believe this will result in
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Comments included:
"* Plan on producing additional work units to generate extra
funds.
"* Funding can be raised through increased efficiency. This
would increase the number of units produced.
"* Expenses need to be addressed in annual budget plans.
There is a slight feeling that funding may be
inadequate under DBOF. However, activities anticipate
offsetting lost resources and opportunities by aggressive
annual budget planning, generating profit by selling
additional units of output, and negotiating favorable unit
cost goals which allow for future capital investment.
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4. DBOF Incentive Structure
Five questions dealt with incentives in DBOF,
including whether and how to improve the incentive structure.
Question 6. Will you count on gaining most of this
discretionary funding (training, equipment replacement,
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Comments included:
"* Reducing cost may require sacrificing quality and be
counter productive.
"* Discretionary funding can be obtained by increasing
efficiency and output or providing better service to the
customer.
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Question 8. Do you feel an automatic percentage should be
applied to the unit cost of awarding a contract to provide
an incentive to take risks and invest in technology to
become more efficient? (e.g., 4%)
Question #8
Proamwt v InoeMnu
N A NO~ 1.2% .
0% 10% 20% 3% 40% 30%
pemtatwe of kteeneeOet
Comments included:
"* Additional funding would more likely end up in awards,
inflated grade structure or furniture rather than
productivity improvements.
"* Implies a centrally controlled process. Centralization is
the fundamental impediment to competition and
discretionary investment.
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Question 9. Do you feel confident the incentive structure
in DBOF is sufficient to reward effective organizations
and promote efficiency?
N P~pme i%
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Comments included:
"* Regulated incentives are not effective.
"* Total Quality Leadership (TQL) process may provide
incentive.
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Question 11. Gainsharing is an incentive structure used
to motivate employees to reduce production costs.
Aviation Depot Cherry Point employees have received such






"* Cost can be reduced by sacrificing quality.
"* Money is not the only incentive, as postulated by TQL.
"* Must have reliable cost and output data fi.rst.
41
Question 12. Could the employee award system replace
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Comments included:
"* Present employee award system needs improvement.
"* TQL works.
"* Awards should be based on efficiency improvements.
Analysis of these questions indicates activities:
1. Believe it may be easier to increase output rather than
cut costs.
2. Were non-committal to a f lat percentage f ee f or prof it.
3. Were apprehensive of DBOF Is ability to reward ef fective
and efficient organizations.
4. Felt gainsharing was the best reward system.
The majority felt that DBOF's incentive structure did
not reward efficiency and effectiveness. Specifically,
commanding officers are left with the employee evaluation
systems, gainsharing, personnel award systems and TQL/TQM.
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The last question was a general survey question asking
respondents if they felt incentive structures were appropriate
and if they had any "better ideas." All activities stated,
"yes" incentive programs are appropriate. However, the only
response provided was to allow activities to retain and carry
unused profits forward to the next fiscal year. This is not
a novel idea and has considerable support and merit. The city
of Visalia, CA successfully adopted an Expenditure Control
Budget.
Called the Expenditure Control Budget, it made two simple
changes. First, it eliminated all line items within
departmental budgets - freeing managers to move resources
around as needs shifted. Second, it allowed departments
to keep what they didn't spend from one year to the next,
so they could shift unused funds to new priorities.
(Osborne92, p. 3)
B. CONCLUSIONS
The accounting system used by NRCCs and FTSCs is
inadequate for unit cost reporting purposes and managerial
decision making. This is supported by the recent GAO
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee which
states, "Current cost accounting systems are fragmented,
costly to maintain, and not effectively utilized by
management." (GA093, p. 10) This same report is very critical
of the Defense Business Management System, previously known as
the Automated Payroll, Cost, and Personnel System, which is to
become the standard for DBOF activities.
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Activities appear to consider DBOF "another form of
budgeting. Funding to cover fixed discretionary expenditures
must be planned and negotiated into the unit cost goal.
Managers do see more freedom in using funding. However, this
has an equal trade-off as availability is now dependent on
output. Surprisingly, the majority of activities anticipate
generating additional profits through an increase in output.
In an era of downsizing, this may be more difficult than first
imagined. Table 4-1 below is an abstract from the Naval
Supply Systems Command Fiscal Years 1992, 1991, and 1990 Level
of Difficulty report. This report suggests the demand for
contracting services is decreasing.
Fiscal Total Large Total Large Total Large
Year Contract Contract Contract
Actions Actions Actions
Completed by Completed by Throughout
FISCs NRCCs NAVSUP
FY90 5,370 7,021 12,391
FY91 5,205 7,283 12,388
FY92 4,962 6,696 11,658
Fiscal Year 1993 data is not available at this time.
However, large contract actions decreased by 725 during Fiscal
Year 1992. Fiscal Year 1992 was the prelude to downsizing.
Generating additional output will be very competitive and
probably restricted to contracting services at bases receiving
new activities in the Base Realignment and Closure process.
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Activities felt that generating profits by cutting unit
cost was unlikely. The main thrust of concern was a loss of
quality which would be counterproductive.
There was a slight feeling that some opportunities for
improvement may be lost because of the potential loss of
discretionary funding under DBOF. However, there was mixed
feelings about adding a small percentage of profit to the unit
cost of providing a service to customers for discretionary
expenses. Most of the criticism centered around central
control and regulation which may result.
It is clear that the majority of contracting activities
felt an incentive structure under DBOF would be appropriate.
However, no recommendations were made. This is partially due
to the lack of information available on DBOF and what would be
appropriate. The next chapter will analyze the advantages,
disadvantages and incentives produced by chargeback methods





Chapter IV survey results indicated that 63.6% of the
commanding officers of contracting activities did not feel
DBOF rewarded or motivated effective organizations to promote
efficiency and effectiveness. This chapter looks at the way
private and public sectors motivate divisions to achieve
desired goals.
In the private sector, motivation and resources for cost
reducing investments are provided through profit. This is not
so in the public sector, where the goal is for socio-economic
benefit, not profit.
Private sector managers are successful if they generate
capital or equity to enhance the wealth of the firm's
stockholders/owners. This can only be done through profit.
Therefore, production and service managers have a strong
incentive to reduce costs and increase profits (profit
maximization) for job security, promotions and wage
increases.12
12In perfect competition, profit maximization occurs when a
firm is operating at the point of economic efficiency. That is
output expands until MB=MC, costs are measured in terms of
opportunity costs and production costs are minimized, see Chapter
III.
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For perfect competition, there are at least two important
aspects that lead to profit maximization. First, firms get to
keep their profit and, secondly, market price is independent
of the actions of any one firm. Therefore, if managers make
an investment to reduce costs, they get the profits and their
actions won't lead to forced lower prices in the future.
These profits will c-ontinue until competing firms lower costs
and price begins to fall. Under these conditions, managers
are .otivated to lower costs. They can retain some profits to
make further cost reducing investments and stay ahead of their
competitors.
Top level management passes this profit maximization
incentive and capability to production and service divisions
through chargeback methods or transfer pricing. These are
methods to value the goods or services transferred from one
department of an organization to another. Chargeback methods
include: unallocated or free allocation, direct allocation and
direct chargeback. 13
This Chapter will look at the advantages, dicadvantages
and incentives of the different forms of chargeback methods
used in public and private sector contracting. They are
13Direct chargeback methods may be either cost based or profit
based. Profit based direct chargeback is utilized when a firm
desires to encourage profit maximization. It bases price on the
competitive market price.
Unfortunately, there are few competitive market firms that
provide contracting services. This makes it difficult to implement
this strategy for contracting services in DoD. Therefore, profit
based direct chargeback will not be reviewed in this thesis.
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unallocated or free allocation and cost based forms of direct
chargeback.
B. UNALLOCATED OR FREE ALLOCATION COST CENTER
Unallocated or Free Allocation cost centers are free cost
centers. That is, other divisions (customers) do not pay for
these services and may use them at will. The cost center
manager is provided an annual budget, and expenses are treated
as overhead or general and administrative costs.
There are some advantages to the unallocated cost center.
It is administratively simple. Very low expenditures are
required on the accounting system, as no chargeback system
exists and costs are not tracked to users. Customers are
encouraged to use the service as they incur no cost.
The disadvantages are significant. The customer sees the
service as free and cost is not a consideration. This may
cause irresponsible use. Also, the inability to establish
cost data isolates the provider from competitive external
pressure permitting and fostering inefficiencies.
Unallocated or free allocation cost centers do not
motivate or provide the capability for managers to reduce
costs and actually invites inefficiency. However, this system
is best when managers desire to increase demand or foster




An interview with a senior contracting executive of a
large military contractor confirmed contracting services were
presently being treated as an unallocated cost center. 1' The
work center is provided an annual budget and no charges are
made for output. As noted, this mechanism provides no
incentive to reduce costs. However, one of the contracting
executive's performance objectives is to stay within his
yearly operating budget. Annually, the executive is graded
and rewarded with a salary bonus of two to five percent
depending on his overall performance evaluation.
During these times of extensive downsizing, this
contractor is reallocating the contracting service costs. A
small portion of the contracting department is treated as
overhead. The major portion of cost is directly charged to
applicable contracts. The contracting department's annual
budget will be much smaller. Therefore, the firm's overhead
rates will go down. However, depending on the contract type
and terms, this may remove any incentive to reduce direct
contracting costs passed along to the customer. Customers
14Several attempts where made to evaluate chargeback mechanisms
and accounting practices used by private sector government
contracting offices. Unfortunately, most private sector firms will
not readily divulge this information as it provides insight into
the cost structure of the firm. This is considered proprietary
data. In an interview, a DCAA auditor revealed that indirect costs
associated with government contracting offices are generally
treated as a General and Administrative expense.
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making frequent changes, modifications and terminations, such
as the Government, will pay higher costs, as they should.
2. Public Sector
This thesis is focused toward Navy contracting
activities which are unallocated cost centers. They presently
do not charge for their services. Funding is provided through
an annual operating budget, which they may not exceed.15
Unfortunately, managers are not allowed to carry forward
unobligated funding from one fiscal year's budget to the next.
This reduces the incentive for cost containment and creates
the well known "use or lose it" philosophy. Since managers
may not exceed their budget, cost savings are rarely part of
the evaluation process. However, efficiency is noted when
budget cuts occur. Managers (military officers) generally
note cost reductions by writing favorable comments on
personnel evaluations (fitness reports). For example, these
comments may note: maintained the highest level of customer
service and increased output by 10% while reducing the annual
budget by 12%.
Similarly, the unallocated cost center mechanism
encourages customers to use the contracting system. This may
"15The Navy portion of Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers and
Navy Regional Contracting Centers negotiate their annual budget
with the Naval Supply Systems Command based on the Productive Unit
Resource (PUR) system. This is a negotiated budgeting system,
based on projected output, very similar to DBOF. Commanding
officers attribute this system with generating much of the
competition presently experienced in Navy contracting.
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create extreme demand and excess workload. For example,
purchases over $25,000.00 require special contracting
procedures which significantly add to the processing/response
time. To save time, customers are motivated to increase the
provider's small purchase workload by splitting these
requirements into several requests under $25,000.00. This
practice, called "splitting," is against DoD regulations and
is inefficient. It diminishes the opportunity for larger
buys, achieving economies of scale, resulting in higher
purchase prices and processing costs.
C. COST BASED DIRECT CHARGEBACK
There are three basic forms of cost based pricing. They
are flexible pricing, average cost pricing and standard cost
pricing. Flexible pricing is a form of demand based pricing.
Different prices are set based on priority or peak loading.
(Fisher93, p. 24) This is not used in contracting by the
private or public sector and will not be analyzed further.
Average cost pricing and standard cost pricing are very
similar and deserve further study.
1. Average Cost Pricing
Average cost pricing sets the price equal to the total
cost of service divided by total output. The advantages are
obvious: administrative simplicity and full cost recovery.
However, there are numerous disadvantages. As briefly
discussed in Chapter III, price is set where demand equals
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average total cost. Price completely disregards marginal
cost. True efficiency occurs where demand equals marginal
cost, not average total cost. Additionally, average costing
encourages customers to consume services until their marginal
benefit equals average total cost vice the efficient point
where their marginal benefit equals marginal cost. As a
result, the service may be under or over utilized. Therein
lays the inefficiency. For example, if the service is under
utilized, the efficiency loss is represented by the triangle
labeled A-B-C in Figure 5-1. If price is set above marginal
cost, consumers will search for alternative providers even if
the cost of serving the consumer is lower than the price
charged. (Gates93, p. 15) (Fisher93, p. 21)
Another disadvantage results because price equals
total cost divided by output. Therefore, price is sensitive
to demand. During periods of high demand, the price falls.
Likewise, during periods of low demand the price rises. This
encourages exactly the opposite of the desired effect. When
demand is low, the high price keeps others from procuring the
service to reduce the price. High demand drives the cost down
so low that more demand is generated, perhaps overburdening
the provider. (Fisher93, p. 23)
Average cost pricing is full cost recovery. There is
no profit factor built into the mechanism. Managers do not
reap any additional benefit from the sale of service.
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or personnel incentives, such as gainsharing, which will be
discussed later in this Chapter.
Lastly, price serves as an indicator of value. The
more value a consumer places on a service the more he is
willing to pay in price during periods of excess demand. This
is best illustrated by the cost of portable electric
generators after a hurricane has knocked out power for an
e tended time. The consumer who wants to save $2,000.00 of
frozen meat in his home freezer will be willing to pay more
and will receive a greater benefit from a portable generator
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than the consumer who wants to watch TV. In average costing,
since all users are charged the same price irrespective of the
benefit they receive, there can be no value or priority placed
on the units provided.
Does average cost pricing encourage efficient
performance by service providers? Full cost recovery is
guaranteed because total cost is divided by demand.
Additionally, price goes down with total cost. This will
increase demand and workload. As costs go up, so do prices,
which decreases demand. If one does not fear losing his job,
this provides no incentive for managers to reduce price/costs
and may motivate slight increases in costs to reduce the
amount of work required. The lack of a natural incentive
mechanism, such as profit maximization, increases reliance on
more punitive mechanisms, like adverse performance
evaluations.
2. Standard Cost Pricing
Standard costing is computed by dividing projected
total cost by demand. The price charged per unit then is
fixed for a given period of time. Obviously, this method of
costing will produce similar advantages and disadvantages as
average cost pricing. The significant incentive advantage is
profit or losses may be generated. Price is based on a
projected value and set for a fixed amount of time. If costs
are lowered and demand remains the same or is greater, a
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profit will be generated. Obviously, if costs are higher or
projected demand is not achieved, losses will be generated.
This accounts for an additional disadvantage. Since
the price is based on projected information, the accuracy of
the projections becomes very important. If the cost is
projected low or demand is projected high, the price will not
cover all the costs of providing the service. Similarly, if
the cost is projected high or demand is projected low full
recovery of costs will occur. Therefore, managers are
motivated to distort demand or cost projections to serve their
favor. (Fisher93, p. 24) (Gates93, p. 12)
3. Private Sector
Ultimately, the goal of any private sector
organization is profit maximization. The different chargeback
mechanisms allow the organization to achieve goals in the most
expeditious manner. For example, if a firm desires wide
spread utilization and quick implementation of a service,
unallocated or free allocation methods should be utilized.
These cost centers are free to all users and customers will
rapidly find uses for such services and products to increase
their own cost center's efficiency or effectiveness.
As wide spread demand for an unallocated cost center's
services grow, demand may become too great. This leads
naturally to a cost based work center. Costs basis will
ensure the customers value that service at least as much as
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the price charged for the service. However, this does not
address the fact that the service is not being provided in the
most efficient manner possible.
The last logical progression in a private sector
market is a profit center. Here services are valued at market
prices and customers are free to utilize "in house" services
or outside competitors. This motivates the previously
unallocated or cost based work centers to be competitive with
other producers and ensures the service is provided in the
most effective and efficient manner possible. This final step
will result in the firm's ultimate goal of profit
maximization.
Some divisions will never progress beyond an
unallocated cost center. Examples of such services are the
home office, accounting and traditionally contracting. These
services are frequently not available in the outside market
and generate little "value added" to the firm's outputs. In
these cases, the private sector motivates personnel to be
efficient and effective through the budget and performance
appraisal systems.
4. Public Sector
The public sector provides services for the welfare
and good of its citizens. Since these same citizens pay for
these services, profit maximization is a controversial goal.
However, cost effectiveness and efficiency, two outcomes
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associated with profit maximization, are appropriate goals.
They ensure the lowest cost burden on the citizens for public
services. In many cases, Government producers are precluded
from increasing efficiency and maximizing profits. The
Government operates in an imperfect market and must consider
many socio-economic goals. How then does the public sector
encourage cost efficiency and effectiveness in their
organizations?
Profit based chargeback would encourage efficiency by
making Government contracting services compete with
competitive market firms. Unfortunately, there are no
competitive market firms selling this service. At the other
extreme unallocated chargeback methods are not effective or
efficient and increase demand until the user receives little
or no value from the last units demanded. The best
alternative available is cost based chargeback methods. Cost
based chargebacks provide only limited incentives for
providers to economize, and customers make usage decisions
based on the services's average total cost rather than
marginal cost.
In addition, cost based pricing is cost sensitive. As
costs go down, price (unit cost in DBOF) goes down to equal
cost. This leaves no profit mechanism to l)motivate personnel
or 2)retain funds to reinvest in cost reduction measures. The
Government has undertaken profit gainsharing to motivate
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personnel to reduce costs.16 However, no initiatives have
been enacted to retain profits and provide the capability for
cost reducing investment. One suggested concept to address
retained profits and motivate cost reduction is success
sharing. Profit gainsharing and success sharing provide a
complete incentive package, which motivates personnel and
provides the resources for cost reduction.
a. Profit Gainsharing
Gainsharing plans are used in DoD as a means to
motivate workers to increase productivity and reduce costs.
This initiative is simplistic in nature. It involves
comparing what this year's output would have cost at last
year's efficiency levels. Then a fraction of the profit
earned through cost savings can be retained by the support
activity for distribution to employees. (Melese93, p. 3) The
remaining profit is kept by the Government. "For companies
that are serious about using incentives to motivate workers,
gainsharing is the best bet." (Hovell90, p. 34) Additionally,
63.6% of commanding officers felt this was an effective
incentive.
16There are numerous incentive programs designed to motivate
a single individual or small group of employees, such as
performance bonuses, commissions, and beneficial suggestions. This
thesis deals with motivating an organization or division.
Therefore, these programs are not within the scope of this thesis
and not discussed.
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The advantages to gainsharing are: activities must
reduce cost or increase efficiency to qualify and Government
reaps a portion of the profits. The disadvantages are: it is
difficult and administratively burdensome to compute the cost
saving, computation requires an effective accounting system,
and product quality can be sacrificed to reduce cost.
17
OSD is presently reviewing gainsharing policy and
procedures. There is concern over possible computational
abuses which have discredited the program in recent years.
(Bishop93)
b. Success Sharing
Success sharing is an innovative incentive
structure suggested by Dr. Francois Melese. It addresses the
expressed objectives of the Defense Business Operations Fund:
to encourage providers to act more like a business, to
increase the visibility of the total cost of a manager's
decision, and reduce the average total cost (unit cost) of
providing a service over time.
Success sharing is an incentive "where the allowed
price next period, while lowered to recognize any cost savings
achieved, is allowed to be a fraction higher than it could be,
to reward the support activity." (Melese93, p. 3) Success
17The Navy has fully embraced TQL/TQM. TQL plays a vital role
in process and quality control. As such, it is the Navy's most
effective tool to ensure unit costs are not achieve at the cost of
quality.
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sharing is conceived to work in conjunction with gainsharing
as a motivational tool.
This concept could be rather simplistic to
administer. Calculations could be ms easy as measuring the
reduction in average total cost from one year to the next.
The two main disadvantages to success sharing are
similar to those of other programs. In particular, unit cost
reduction may come at the expense of quality. Furthermore,
gainsharing is an integral part of the plan. Therefore, the
disadvantages associated with gainsharing apply to success
sharing.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Profit plays a vital role in the private sector including
the incentive for personnel to reduce costs and the capability
or resources to make cost reducing investments. Both facets
are equally important. If a producer is motivated to make a
cost reducing investment, but is not provided the capability,
the investment can't be made. Similarly, if the producer is
provided the capability but not the incentive, the pLofits
will be spent on items which provide personal satisfaction,
like new furniture. This is why it is so important to address
both functions cf profit in the public sector.
DBOF and Unit Cost Resourcing are a form of standard cost
pricing. As such, they exhibit many of the same advantages
and disadvantages. Advantages include:
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* Identifies the organization's products or services, and
the total cost of providing the output.
* Forces customers to make a value judgement and consider
the cost of the service when making decisions.
Disadvantages include:
"* Does not produce economic efficiencies.
"* Motivates managers to distort cost and demand projections
in their favor.
"• Decreases in costs result in decreases in price.
Therefore, profit is not retained.
It is the sensitivity of price to cost and the inability to
retain profit which destroys the incentive for managers to
reduce costs and seek efficiency.
Gainsharing, while administrative burdensome, encourages
personnel to become more effective and efficient.
Additionally, providers of contracting services perceive a
competitive environment, based on the Naval Supply Systems
Command Productive Unit Resource system, which provides
further personal incentive to reduce costs. (see Chapter IV)
However, as discussed in Chapter III, organizations need
resources to provide cost reduction and efficiency
improvements. These resources can be provided through
retained profits. Without success sharing, DBOF and Unit Cost
Resourcing does not provide for these capabilities.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO)OEENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The central question of this thesis is: Under the Defense
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) concept and unit costing for
contracting services, will the managers of contracting
activities be motivated and have the resources available to
accept increased short term costs to improve either the long
run effectiveness or quality of the contract services they
provide? DBOF provides some motivation to increase efficiency
and effectiveness. However, it does not provide the short
term resources.
Unfortunately, only 27.3 percent of commanding officers
felt very confident adequate funding would be available to
carry out training and efficiency investments. Similarly,
63.6 percent felt competition exists, or will develop, for
business. The competitive nature of organizations and desire
for job security and gainsharing motivates employees to
increase efficiency and quality. This is supported by the
analysis in Chapter V, which indicates potential motivation to
reduce cost, but no resources.
To meet unit cost targets, commanding officers may put off
discretionary expenses for routine maintenance and
productivity enhancements, such as upgrading computer hardware
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and software, replacing worn out furniture and fixtures and
enhancing professional training. All of these omissions will
have an adverse impact on morale and productivity.
Over the long run, "slack" will be squeezed out of
contracting activity budgets and unit cost targets may only
cover essential short run operating costs. Discretionary
expenses and long run enhancements will need to be funded
through other mechanisms.
As DoD funding has declined since 1985, commands have
absorbed reductions through lower output and reduced
discretionary expenses that are not related to output.
The perception of the Services is that most of that
flexibility is gone. (Hough93)
The survey showed 63.6 percent of commanding officers will
plan effective annual budgets to cover future unanticipated
costs. Therefore, unit costs should fluctuate somewhat until
true fixed and variable cost can be isolated and evaluated.
Even then, commanding officers will need resources to adjust
their costing structure to a constantly changing demand and
business environment. This is the function retained profits
should fulfill. OSD and the Services should keep this in mind
when negotiating unit cost targets and take a lenient approach




The following recommendations are offered to motivate and
reward successful cost reducing organizations and provide
funding for their future use.
Recommendation 1: Select and implement a standardized
accounting system.
Managers need to identify cost drivers and isolate fixed
and variable costs. Contracting activities need cost analysis
to establish the activity's position on the average total cost
curve and identify the best strategy to reduce cost in the
future.
Fifty-four percent of the contracting officers queried
place little to no confidence in their present accounting
system. The most recent GAO report on DBOF (13 May 1993) is
very critical of the present accounting systems citing:
"current cost accounting systems are fragmented, costly to
maintain, and not effectively utilized by management." (GA093,
p. 10) Additionally, the report criticizes OSD's decision
making criteria for the Defense Business Management System
(DBMS). It is important to understand the cost structure of
the contracting activity to properly plan and budget for next
year's expenditures and monitor and evaluate the results of
decisions. Other very valuable programs revolve around an
accurate accounting system including accounting reports and
gainsharing.
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Recommendation 2: Where possible, streamline and simplify
the Employee Award system to include
gainsharing as a prerogative of the
commanding officer, when profits are
generated.
Successful commanding officers need to have the
discretionary power to pass incentives down to their
employees. The process of gainsharing is administratively
burdensome. However, 63 percent of the activities queried
thought it was an effective incentive. Gainsharing could be
simplified and incorporated into the employee award system.
Additionally, commanding officers gave the employee award
system mixed reviews. It may need streamlining.
Recommendation 3: Initiate Success sharing.
Success sharing provides productive activities with
additional funds to enhance their productivity. (Melese93)
Gainsharing will provided personnel incentive and success
sharing will provide the necessary resources for successful
activities to increase capacity and serve more customers.
Recommendation 4: Allow activities to keep profits.
This tails onto Recommendation 3 (success sharing).
Activities earned cost authority is equal to actual production
times the unit cost goal. The excess between earned cost
authority minus obligations is profits and vice-a-versa for
losses. If an activity does not obligate its earned cost
authority, these profits are returned to the Government.
While DBOF intended to stop the "use it or loss it" mentality,
the opposite may occur. An activity only gains a few benefits
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from not spending the additional funding. They may have a
lower unit cost than other providers, which looks good for
evaluation purposes. Alternatively, some of the profits may
be returned to the employees in the form of gainsharing.
Efficient organizations who can increase output at reduced
costs or lower unit costs to generate profit are exactly the
activities who should be allowed to keep and invest profits.
When queried, several commanding officers noted that the
ability to retain earned profits would be a tremendous asset.
This allows activities to make larger investments in
productivity and provides the resources necessary.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the essential factors of Defense Business
Operations Fund?
The essential factors of the Defense Business Operations
Fund are those elements which make it more like the private
sector markets, unit cost and stabilized rate. The unit cost
is the average total cost to provide a service or good. The
stabilized rate is the price the customer pays for the service
or good provided.
2. What is the process for establishing a costing structure
under Unit Cost Resourcing?
The elements of the costing structure are the unit cost
and predetermined unit cost goals. As stated in question 1,
the unit cost is total cost (direct costs, indirect cost,
general and administrative expense, depreciation and military
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personnel) divided by total output. Total output is primary
outputs and any other outputs which are provided to the
customer.
The unit cost calculated above is forwarded to the Office
of Secretary Defense and adjusted for inflation, new elements
of cost and any productivity enhancements which may have been
implemented. The adjusted unit cost becomes the provider's
unit cost goal.
3. What incentives and capabilities are structured into a
DBOF/Unit Cost Resourcing contracting environment?
A manager's ability to meet or achieve their activity's
cost goals may be used as an input for their personnel
evaluation. Additionally, Office of Secretary of Defense has
implied the unit cost of a provider may be considered in base
realignment and closures. This provides a very personal,
unhealthy impetus to cut costs.
While unit cost is not an accurate measure of how well an
activity provides a service, it has become a basis for
competition between activities and managers. This is a
healthy incentive outcome.
4. What are the benefits and disadvantages of chargeback
methods and how well do they produce incentives and
resources?
Unallocated or free allocation has very limited benefits
and provides few incentives for cost efficiency. This may be
why the public sector is moving away from it. Cost based
chargeback methods ensure full cost recovery from customers
67
and force customers to consider the cost and benefit of
providing those services when making business decisions. They
produce very little incentive other than competition to lower
unit costs between activities. This is more than likely why
supplemental incentive programs, e.g., gainsharing and basis
for personnel evaluations, have been implemented.
5. Now could the incentive structure be improved and
incorporated into DBOF and the Unit Cost Resourcing?
Managers must be provided with the motivation/incentive to
cut costs and capability/resources. Gainsharing is a powerful
motivation tool. However, the lack of profits in a cost based
structure removes the capability/resource aspect. Success
sharing allows activities to keep a small portion of their
cost savings, providing the required resources. Therefore,
two of the strongest incentives would be the ability to retain
unobligated profits at the end of the fiscal year for future
use and the implementation of success sharing to mitigate
price reductions and allow for some future profits.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Conduct an analysis of the demand for contracting
services. The stabilized rate should offer some
evidence to determine the elasticity of demand and
provide a better economic picture of the need for these
services.
2. Conduct an analysis of the possibilities of turning
contracting over to the private sector and only
performing those required acts of governance, such as
policy making and decision making to the public sector.
68
3. Conduct an analysis of unit cost trends in contracting
to see if efficiency in unit costs is achieved,
increased, or not affected.
4. Develop the Average Total Cost Curve for contracting
services throughout the Navy.
5. Evaluate the prospect of "gaming" DBOF and Unit Cost
Resourcing by under estimating anticipated workload in
follow-on years to increase unit cost targets.
6. Evaluate the prospect of customers and providers
negotiating reimbursable Inter or Intra-service Support
Agreements directly, vice utilizing DBOF, at rates




Excerpts from Naval Supply Systems Command
Fiscal Year 1992 Level of Difficulty Report
LARGE CONTRACT COSTS
Fleet and Number of
Industrial Productive Unit Total
Supply Center Resources Cost
Charleston, SC 7,052 $2,771,000
Jacksonville, FL 1,870 945,000
Norfolk, VA 6,780 2,727,000
Oakland, CA 900 653,000
Pearl Harbor, HI 1,636 1,131,000
Pensacola, FL 739 416,000
Puget Sound, WA 5,540 1,817,000
Guam 307 88,000







Military personnel payroll costs and depreciation expenses are
not available at this time and not reflected in these costs.
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